A Stochastic Model of Mortality, Fertility, and Human Capital Investment by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
A Stochastic Model of Mortality, Fertility, and Human
Capital Investment ∗




This paper examines the relationship between fertility and human capital investment,
and it’s implications for economic growth, focusing on the eﬀects of declining mortality.
Unlike the existing literature, this paper stresses the role of uncertainty about the number
of surviving children. If the marginal utility of a surviving child is convex then there will
be a precautionary demand for children. As the mortality rate and thus uncertainty falls,
this demand decreases. Furthermore, lower mortality encourages educational investment
in children. The key result is that this empirically observed quality-quantity trade oﬀ is
realized only if uncertainty is incorporated into individual’s optimization problem.
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Three major developments of the past century are the declines in mortality and fertility rates
and the growth of educational investment. These events have occurred both in the developed
countries and in the developing countries.1 The relationship between these three phenomena
has non-trivial implications for economic growth.
Since increased life span implies a higher rate of return, declining child and youth mor-
tality provides an important incentive to increase investment in the education of each child.
Numerous researchers have emphasized that human capital accumulation is the prime engine
for economic growth. They have not, however, rigorously investigated this particular mecha-
nism through which increased survival chances promote growth by raising the human capital
investment.
Historical and contemporary data show that mortality decline preceded the fertility de-
cline in general.2 As a result, countries have experienced a phase of increasing population
growth rates followed by a phase of declining rates. This whole phenomenon is known as “de-
mographic transition” and has important implications for the process of economic growth.
1Although the likelihood of survival for all ages increased tremendously between 1780 and 1990, the most
signiﬁcant reduction in mortality was realized at infancy and childhood. In 1780, in Sweden, a newborn child
had a 60% chance of living to age 20. By 1930, this ﬁgure had risen to 90%. Infant and child mortality
fell approximately 60% between 1950 and 1990 in less developed regions (LDCs) of the world. In developed
countries, fertility decline, which began by the end of the nineteenth century, was completed by World War II.
During this period, the total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 5 children to 2.5 children. In the developing
world, the fertility transition started around the 1950s, and over the past forty years TFR declined from 6
children to 3 children. The average number of years of schooling in England rose from 2.3 for the cohorts
born between 1801 and 1805 to 9.1 for the cohorts born between 1897 and 1906. It rose even further to 14 for
the 1974-1992 cohorts. In LDCs, gross secondary school enrollment increased from 17.1% in 1960 to 46.9% in
1990. See Livi-Bacci (1997), United Nations (1999), and Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982).
2France is an exception, where fertility decline began early in the nineteenth century before the mortality
had declined. The U.S. also has declining fertility early in the nineteenth century.
1Lucas (1998) argues that demographic transition and industrial revolution are linked events
and what is new about 1800 is not technological change by itself but the fact that fertil-
ity increases no longer translated improvements in technology into increases in population.
Therefore, understanding the causes of the fertility transition is crucial in terms of past,
present and future economic growth.
One explanation of the fertility transition is the reduction in infant and child mortality.3
Previous literature models causality running from mortality to fertility as follows: if house-
holds are concerned about the number of surviving children, and if they desire a speciﬁc
number of survivors, then a reduction in mortality may lead to a corresponding reduction
in fertility. While this direct channel accounts for the signiﬁcant portion of the reduction in
fertility, it is an incomplete explanation since it cannot explain the reduction in the “net rate
of reproduction” (NRR), and hence the reduction in the population growth rate.4
Existing models of endogenous fertility, if they allow for mortality at all, do so in the
3The other explanations of the fertility transition include the following. Becker (1981) proposes that parents
decrease their fertility because of the increased opportunity cost of children due to higher wages given the
assumption that substitution eﬀect dominates at higher levels of income. Caldwell (1976) claims the decline
for the need of old-age support from children as a result of development and modernization caused fertility
to decline. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) argue that as a result of increased technological progress the returns
to education increases, causing a quality-quantity trade oﬀ and hence a fertility transition. In another paper,
Galor and Weil (1996) argue that higher wages for women raise the cost of children relatively more than they
raise household income, and lead to a reduction in the number of children that couples choose to have. Becker
and Barro (1988) say the decline in fertility is a result of the aggregate consumption growth and Becker et al.
(1990) claim fertility declined due to the increase in the aggregate level of human capital. Azariadis and Drazen
(1991), Brezis (2001), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) use the change in the structure of the economy, the role of
the social classes and the eﬀect of income inequality as explanations for the fertility transition, respectively.
For the developing countries the dissemination of birth control methods is also proposed as an explanation
for the decline in fertility. However studies found that family planning programs explain only 10%-40% of the
decline in fertility in developing countries and the rest of the decline is explained by the changes in desired
fertility, i.e., number of children families wanted to have (Weil, 2001). Which of these explanations, including
mortality decline, can explain a bigger fraction of the decline in fertility is still an open empirical question.
4The NRR is the number of daughters that each girl can be expected to produce, i.e., it is the factor by
which the number of girls in each generation will increase. Thus, NRR shows by what factor population will
grow over a generation.
2context of certainty.5 High mortality is modeled as reducing the fraction of children who
survive to adulthood. Thus, these models ignore the uncertainty about the number of sur-
viving children that is present in a high mortality environment. Uncertainty has been found
to be important in a number of other areas of economics, and this paper illustrates that it is
also critical in the context of survival of children. Indeed, it is shown that a model without
uncertainty produces results at variance with the data.
The model here is built on the eﬀects of mortality decline on the fertility and education
decision of parents. If the marginal utility of a surviving child is convex in the number
of survivors, then there will be a precautionary demand for children. Thus, parents are
prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990). Since parents choose the number of births before
they know how many children will survive, in a high mortality environment they will increase
the number of births beyond the number required to produce the desired number of survivors
in expectation. As the mortality rate and thus uncertainty falls, this precautionary demand
decreases, and so does the NRR. Second, lower mortality increases a child’s expected life
span, which encourages investment in the child’s human capital. The resources allocated to
additional investment in education are freed by the reduction in fertility. Thus, parents ﬁnd
it optimal to move along a quality-quantity frontier, having fewer children and investing more
resources in each one. The key result is that this quality-quantity trade oﬀ is realized only if
uncertainty is incorporated into individual’s optimization problem.
As a result this paper makes two novel contributions. The ﬁrst is to establish the positive
5See section 2 for the review of the literature.
3link between increased survival and human capital investment in an endogenous fertility
framework. Some of the previous literature found that changes in mortality had no eﬀect on
the optimal amount of education. The second contribution is a proposed mechanism under
which the relationship between the mortality decline and the fertility decline can be causal.
Uncertainty about child survival gives rise to a precautionary demand for children. Thus,
exogenous reductions in mortality lead to a decline in fertility and eventually in population
growth. These two contributions indicate that relying on the causality from mortality to
fertility to explain the fertility transition is not at odds with the view that fertility decline is
due to a quality-quantity trade oﬀ. Increased child survival and the quality-quantity trade
oﬀ are complementary explanations, and together they tell a more complete story of fertility
decline.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the related
literature. Section 3 introduces and solves the model under both certainty and uncertainty.
Section 4 discusses the conclusion and extensions.
2 Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Literature
Eckstein et al. (1998), in a study of Swedish fertility dynamics, show that the reduction in
infant and child mortality is the most important factor explaining the fertility decline, while
increases in the real wages can explain less than one-third of the fertility decline.6
There may be two diﬀerent strategies at work that generate the fertility response.7 First,
6See also Galloway et al. (1998), Coale (1986), and Preston (1978b).
7In general, fertility responds to the mortality decline with a lag. The main reason for this lag is that it
4the “replacement strategy,” is the response of fertility to experienced deaths, where parents
replace deceased children. Second, the “insurance strategy,” or hoarding, is the response of
fertility to expected deaths, where parents bear more children than their optimal number of
survivors. If parents follow a replacement strategy, they can produce their target number of
survivors with no error and a change in child mortality will have no eﬀect on NRR. In the
empirical studies using micro data, the estimated replacement eﬀect is always smaller than
0.5 and generally it is around 0.2. But only a replacement eﬀect of 1 means a fully working
replacement strategy.8 To the extent that parents do not engage in a full-ﬂedged replacement
strategy, they also follow a partial insurance strategy that is they have a precautionary
demand for children.
The earliest theoretical formulations is based on the “target fertility model,” which pro-
vides the intuition for hoarding mechanism. This model implies that in order to have N
surviving children, N/q children must be borne if the survival rate is q. Thus, an increase
in q always reduces the number of births, whereas the number of surviving children would
not change since the decline in the number of births is exactly compensatory. However,
this framework ignores the fact that children are economic goods and hence they are costly.
O’Hara (1975) and Ben-Porath (1976) tried to incorporate a budget constraint into their
analysis, where an increase in the survival rate reduces the number of births only if demand
for children is inelastic with respect to its price (the cost of a child). Nevertheless, the number
of surviving children must increase given the fact that children are not Giﬀen goods. Thus,
takes parents some time to recognize that mortality has fallen.
8See Schultz (1997).
5it could be optimal to have fewer births at a positive mortality rate than at a zero mortality
rate, which is the opposite of hoarding. Indeed, Becker and Barro (1988) include mortality
in their basic model of fertility and show that the decline in mortality lowers the cost of
raising a survivor and thus increases the demand for surviving children. This implies that
births rise in response to a decline in mortality, which is not consistent with the data. Sah
(1991) develops a stochastic discrete time model where he shows that the number of children
produced by a couple declines as the mortality rate declines. This is the ﬁrst theoretical
paper that investigates this causal relationship in an uncertain environment.
There has not been much work linking mortality to investments in education. Some
researchers investigate the direct eﬀect of mortality on education. Meltzer (1992) shows that
mortality decline in Mexico from 1920 to 1965 is resulted in a 9.2% increase in the rate
of return, which in turn implies a 20% increase in the enrollment rates. Ram and Schultz
(1979) argue that improvements in mortality have been an important incentive to increase
investment in education, and the post war experience of India is consistent with this incentive.
In a recent paper, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), calibrating their model by using returns to
schooling estimates, show that mortality decline produces signiﬁcant increases in schooling.9
9Some papers have investigated the eﬀects of changes in life expectancy and/or child mortality both on
fertility and human capital investment (see Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Meltzer (1992), Jones (1999), and Tamura
(2002).) Uncertainty regarding the survival of children, however, is not part of any of these models, with
the exception of Tamura (2002). Like this paper, Tamura (2002) adopts the expected utility maximization
problem and the methodology to solve this problem from Kalemli-Ozcan (2000).
63 The Model
Consider an OLG model, where individuals within a generation have identical preferences.
Members of generation t live for two periods: in the ﬁrst period of life, (t − 1), individuals
consume a fraction of their parent’s unit time endowment. In the beginning of the second
period of life, (t), individuals make a one-time fertility decision.
The preferences of the altruistic member of generation t are deﬁned over second period’s
consumption, Ct, and the future income of the survivors, Ntwt+1ht+1, where Nt is the number
of survivors, wt+1 is the future wage of a survivor per unit of human capital and ht+1 is the
human capital of a survivor. Et denotes expectation as of time (t). The utility function for
a member of generation t can be written as,10











Human capital production is given by
ht+1 = e
β
t ht, 0 < β < 1, (2)
where et is the education level of a child and ht is the level of parental human capital.
Households choose the number of children, nt, and the optimal amount of education to
give to each child, et, where each child’s survival is uncertain. These choices are subject to a
10This formulation, where parents get utility from the future income of survivors instead of the future utility,
is adopted from Galor and Weil (2000). In that paper the authors do not consider mortality and hence parents
get utility from the future income of their children.
7constraint on the total amount of time, which is unity. Assuming a ﬁxed time cost, v ∈ (0,1),
for every child, the time left for the household after the child-bearing cost is incurred, is
1−vnt. This remaining time is divided between work to earn a wage income and educational
investment.11,12 Therefore, the budget constraint is
wtht(1 − (v + et)nt) = Ct. (3)
3.1 Benchmark Case: Optimization without Uncertainty
To show the importance of uncertainty, I ﬁrst examine a benchmark case with certainty. In
this case the random nature of the number of surviving children is completely ignored. Hence
the number of survivors are given by the expected number of survivors, Nt = Et(Nt) = ntq,
where q ∈ (0,1) is the survival probability of each child. Substituting the budget constraint





wtht(1 − (v + et)nt)
i






subject to: (nt,et) ≥ 0.
11Notice that there can be two diﬀerent scenarios regarding the educational investment. Education may be
provided before or after the uncertainty about mortality is realized. This paper investigates the ex-ante case.
The ex-post case, where education is provided after the uncertainty is resolved is considered in Kalemli-Ozcan
(2000), which yields results similar to those of this paper. This is important since some researchers have
argued that most of the mortality decline has occurred in infancy and therefore a decline in mortality should
not matter for the human capital investment decision, which comes later in life.
12Tamura and Sadler (2001) show that child mortality can eﬀect human capital investment via a diﬀerent
channel, namely diﬀerential treatment of children. Human capital investment can be specialized in a few
children, not in all children. This would also work to decrease investments in the face of child mortality.
However uncertainty about child survival, in the sense of this paper, is not part of their model.
8The optimization with respect to nt implies that the total time spent on children is a
ﬁxed fraction of the total time endowment, 1 − γ, and the remaining fraction, γ, is devoted





The optimization with respect to et implies that the time spent educating children is nega-








Solving two ﬁrst order conditions simultaneously implies
nt =







Proposition 1: Under certainty, an exogenous increase in the survival probability has
no eﬀect on either fertility or human capital investment.
Proof: Follows directly from (7).
As a result, if human capital investment is the engine for growth, mortality decline will
not be conducive to economic growth. But why does mortality decline have no eﬀect on
9the optimal choices of the endogenous variables? Technically, the result follows from the
fact that log utility implies unitary elastic demand for children with respect to their cost.
The intuition is straightforward. With increased survival, the price of a surviving birth,
v/q, declines, thus making the quantity of survivors relatively more desirable given the fact
that children are normal goods. This price change has income and substitution eﬀects. The
income eﬀect indicates that both consumption and the expected number of survivors will
increase, which in turn implies that the number of children will rise. The substitution eﬀect
works in the opposite direction, meaning consumption will decline and the expected number
of survivors will increase. With log utility the income and substitution eﬀects balance out, so
consumption is not aﬀected by the increase in q. Thus, the budget constraint in (3) implies
the optimum number of children does not change, given the fact that the optimum amount
of education does not change with q.13
Why doesn’t the optimum amount of education change with q in a world with no un-
certainty? Due to the decreased cost of survivors parents want to increase the expected
number of survivors by producing more children. But the relative price of an educated sur-
vivor doesn’t change. With high mortality, like 50%, in order to have one educated survivor
parents must have two children and provide the same amount of education to each. But if
there is no mortality then parents can have one child and educate him or her and hence they
13One can also perform a similar exercise with a CRRA utility function. With high elasticity of substitution,
consumption decreases with an increase in q, which in turn implies dnt/dq > 0 through (3), again given the




1−σ , the parameter σ is the inverse value of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Thus, the result dCt/dq < 0 requires σ < 1. This parameter restriction also implies children have an elastic
demand with respect to their cost.
10can have one educated survivor. Thus, there is no point in changing the optimal amount of
education with an increase in q.14 When uncertainty is allowed there will be an additional
eﬀect (risk eﬀect) which alters the results of Proposition 1, as shown in the next section.
What about the eﬀect of increased survival on the population growth rate? The popula-
tion growth rate can be written as
Lt+1
Lt
− 1 = Et(Nt) − 1 = ntq − 1, (8)
where Lt is the size of the population at time t.15
Proposition 2: Under certainty, there is a positive eﬀect of an increase in the survival





(1 − γ)(1 − β)
v
> 0. (9)
(9) simply follows from the fact that the optimum number of children does not change with
q. This is what I call the “mean eﬀect.”
14In technical terms, for any type of utility, the change in q aﬀects marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and the number of children but does not aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution between the
number of children and the amount of education that is given to each child. This is due to the combined eﬀect
of the following two assumptions: the separability of the utility function and the multiplicative formulation of
the second argument of the utility function.
15Note that due to the law of large numbers there is no aggregate uncertainty even though there is individual
uncertainty, and hence the population growth rate is Et(Nt) − 1.
113.2 Optimization with Uncertainty
In this section I incorporate uncertainty into the previous setup. As in the benchmark case,
let q be the survival probability of each child, which is ﬁxed over time. With uncertainty,
Nt, the number of survivors, will be a random variable drawn from a binomial distribution.






qNt(1 − q)nt−Nt Nt = 0,1,...,nt,∀t. (10)
Members of generation t choose the number of children, and the optimal amount of














This formulation implies that the number of children born and the number of surviving
children are represented as nonnegative integers, which is a discrete representation.16
I use the Delta Method to approximate the utility around the mean of the binomial
distribution. This approach allows me to incorporate the variance, which is nothing but the
risk eﬀect, in a tractable way. By using the Delta Method and taking expectations, I can
rewrite the maximization of expected utility as,17
16See Sah (1991).





wtht(1 − (v + et)nt)
i










subject to: (nt,et) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to et is same as in the certainty case,
et =
β(1 − γ)




The main diﬀerence between the certainty case and the uncertainty case is the optimiza-
tion with respect to nt. Here, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to nt is non-linear due
to the expected utility maximization,
−γ(v + et)









Due to uncertainty, parents engage in a self-insurance strategy and overshoot their desired
fertility. This “insurance eﬀect” is nothing but the risk eﬀect that is incorporated through
the variance of the binomial distribution, which aﬀects the optimization with respect to nt,
and hence the comparative statics. Thus,
Proposition 3: When uncertainty is incorporated into the parent’s optimization problem,
an exogenous increase in the survival probability (a decline in mortality), causes them to
engage in a quality-quantity trade oﬀ.
13dnt
dq




Proof: See Appendix B.18
Comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 1 reveals how signiﬁcant the role of uncertainty is.
The model also generates the stylized fact of the demographic transition, that is, population
growth is a hump-shaped function of the survival probability.
Proposition 4: Under uncertainty, at low levels of survival an increase in the survival
probability unambiguously raises the population growth rate, while at high levels of survival an
increase in the survival probability causes the population growth rate to decline if the returns
to education are high enough.
d(Lt+1/Lt)
dq







∂q . Uncertainty comes from the variance but high mortality does
not necessarily mean high variance. So the second partial does not have to be negative for all the values
of the survival probability, q. For given number of children the expected number of survivors (mean of the
binomial distribution) always increases with a rise in the survival probability but the variance of the binomial
rises or falls according to the value of the survival probability. If the survival probability is bigger than 1/2
the variance falls with a rise in the survival probability. But due to the Delta Method approximation the
second partial is negative for all the values of q. This is consistent with the data. We don’t see mortality rates
that are higher than 50% in the data for historical populations. Thus, the survival probability we observe in
the data is always higher than 1/2. This implies an increase in the survival probability will always lower the
variance in the data. Therefore showing the negativeness of the total derivative in proposition 3 implies that
the ﬁrst partial is positive as it should be since this represents the precautionary demand.
14d(Lt+1/Lt)
dq
< 0 if q ∼ = 1 and β ∼ = 1,
d2(Lt+1/Lt)
dq2 < 0, ∀q.
Proof: See Appendix B.
When the survival probability is low, the mean eﬀect (see proposition 2) dominates and
therefore the population growth rate increases with the increased survival rate. When the
survival probability is high, although the population growth rate may increase due to the
increased number of survivors, the negative response of fertility can oﬀset this mean eﬀect.
Most of the quality-quantity trade oﬀ literature assumed a linear human capital production
function, meaning β = 1. Therefore, as evidence suggests, population growth is a concave
function of the survival probability, for any q, and if β is close to 1 it is a hump-shaped
function.
As a result, this setup establishes the link from mortality to fertility and to human capital
investment and hence it is enough to show the positive eﬀect of mortality decline on economic
growth. The higher human capital investment and the lower population growth will enhance
economic growth. These forces arise as a result of quality-quantity trade oﬀ decision of
parents. But this quality-quantity trade oﬀ is realized only if uncertainty is incorporated into
individual’s optimization problem.
154 Conclusion and Extensions
Empirical studies show that there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of human capital investment
and a negative eﬀect of fertility on economic development. Furthermore, researchers have
found a positive correlation between life expectancy (or health proxies) and the rate of eco-
nomic growth (Barro, 1997). However, there is not any study that provides direct evidence
regarding the mechanism through which higher life expectancy promotes growth.
Based on these empirical ﬁndings one such mechanism could be mortality decline working
through the channels of education and fertility to enhance economic growth. Economic models
will miss this point unless the role of uncertainty about the number of surviving children is
fully incorporated. This omission is the primary reason that some of the previous literature
has found results that are at variance with the data. This paper resolves this inconsistency
between theory and the data by incorporating uncertainty into the individual’s optimization
problem. Here, individuals are prudent in the face of uncertainty about child survival, which
causes a precautionary demand for children. As the mortality rate and thus uncertainty falls,
precautionary demand decreases, and thus, parents choose to move along a quality-quantity
frontier.
In this paper the survival probability has been assumed exogenous and ﬁxed over time.
However, both time-series and cross-sectional empirical studies have found that as income
per capita in a country rises, mortality rates tend to fall. Based on this evidence, future
research will involve endogenizing the survival probability. This can be done by considering
the survival probability to be a concave function of income per capita. Then, this concave
16relation between the survival probability and income per capita results in a hump-shaped
relation between the population growth rate and income per capita, since the population
growth rate is a hump-shaped function of the survival probability as shown in this paper.
This hump-shaped pattern of the population growth rate as a function of income per capita
will have dynamical implications. In a stochastic world, depending on the levels of income
and hence the nature of improvements in mortality, a country can be trapped around a
development trap type steady state or can grow forever. One can further include endogenous
technological progress. In that case an exogenous decline in mortality can serve as the basis
for a uniﬁed growth model that describes the complete transition from an underdeveloped
world to the modern growth era.19
19A discussion of this is given in Galor and Weil (1999).
17Appendix A
The Delta Method is a statistical method that has been used extensively in statistical contexts
to solve similar problems. The ﬁrst step of the Delta Method is a Taylor series approxima-
tion of the utility around the mean of the distribution. I am going to do a third degree
approximation around the mean Nt = ntq, since higher order terms can be disregarded for
simplicity.


















Substituting (18) in (17) and taking expectations implies
Et(Ut) = Ut(ntq) + 0 −
(1 − γ)
2(ntq)2ntq(1 − q) + 0. (19)
The ﬁrst term is the utility function evaluated at the mean. The second term is zero since
E(N − nq) = 0. The third term is the variance (second central moment) of the binomial,
which is E(N − nq)2 = σ2 = nq(1 − q). The fourth term is zero since it is the third central
18moment, E(N − µ)3 = 0.20
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3:
Multiplying (14) by n2
t and substituting et from (13) gives
G(nt,q) =
−nt(vntγ + β(1 − γ))
1 − vnt
+ (1 − γ)nt +
(1 − γ)(1 − q)
2q
= 0, (20)
which deﬁnes nt implicitly.







(20) can also be written as
(1 − γ)(1 − q)
2q
=
n(vnγ + β(1 − γ))
1 − vn
− (1 − γ)n. (22)
Thus, LHS of (22) is only a function of q and RHS of it is only a function of n.
LHSq(q) = Gg, (23)
RHSn(n) = −Gn.
20See Casella and Berger (1990).
19Given 0 < q ≤ 1, it is easy to show that LHS(q) is always negative
LHSq(q) = −
(1 − γ)
2q2 < 0 ∀q, (24)
LHSqq(q) =
(1 − γ)




Gq < 0 ∀q. (25)
The budget constraint in (3) implies that 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
v. Then it is easy to show that RHS(n)
is always positive for the range of n that is relevant for ﬁnding an optimum. RHS(n) can be
written as
RHS(n) =
n(vn − (1 − γ)(1 − β))
(1 − vn)
. (26)
Taking the derivative with respect to n gives
RHSn(n) =
vn(2 − vn) − (1 − γ)(1 − β)
(1 − vn)2 . (27)
To determine the sign of (27), one has to evaluate the following:
20limn→0RHSn(n) = −(1 − γ)(1 − β) < 0, (28)
limn→1/vRHSn(n) = +∞,
RHSnn(n) =
2v(γ + β(1 − γ))




−Gn > 0 ∀n. (29)













Proof of Proposition 4:
Substituting nt = Lt+1/Lt/q and the optimal et from (13) into (14) and using the notation
P = Pt+1 = Lt+1/Lt gives,
21e G(P,q) = −2vP2 + 2q(1 − β)(1 − γ)P + (1 − γ)(1 − q)(q − vP) = 0. (32)











(1 − γ)[2(1 − β)P + vP + 1 − 2q]
4vP − (1 − γ)[2(1 − β)q − (1 − q)v]
. (34)






> 0 if q = 0. (35)




(1 − γ)[2(1 − β)n + vn − 1]
4vn − 2(1 − γ)(1 − β)
< 0 if q = 1 and β = 1. (36)
Substituting n = (1 − γ)(1 − β)/v (since q = 1), gives the necessary condition for (36),




2(1 − β) + v
. (37)
If β = 1, or v > (1−γ)(1−β) and 2(1−β)+v < 1, this equation is satisﬁed. This condition
22also implies having the maximum point of P as a function of q bigger then 1.
Proof of Concavity:
d2P















(−Gn)3 < 0 ∀q. (39)
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